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THE SOURCE, NATURE, AND CONTENT OF THE 
CROWN’S UNDERLYING TITLE TO ABORIGINAL 
TITLE LANDS
Kent McNeil*
The highest courts in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have consistently 
held that the Crown has the underlying title to Aboriginal title lands. The United 
States Supreme Court has likewise concluded that either the federal or state 
governments have the underlying title to Indian lands. However, the source, 
nature, and content of this title remain obscure. This article will examine the 
relevant case law and contend that, in Canada, the Crown’s underlying title 
is a purely proprietary interest that does not amount to a current beneficial 
interest and does not entail any jurisdictional authority. It is sourced in the 
doctrine of tenure and is not unlike the title the Crown has under the common 
law to lands that are held in fee simple.
Les plus hautes instances judiciaires de l’Australie, du Canada et de la 
Nouvelle-Zélande ont uniformément affirmé que la Couronne possède le droit 
de propriété sous-jacent du titre ancestral. La Cour suprême des États-Unis 
a elle aussi conclu que le droit de propriété sous-jacent des terres indiennes 
appartient soit au gouvernement fédéral soit au gouvernement de chaque État. 
Toutefois, la source, la nature et le contenu de ce droit de propriété demeurent 
obscurs. Cet article porte sur la jurisprudence pertinente et soutient qu’au 
Canada, le droit de propriété sous-jacent de la Couronne est un droit de 
propriété pur et simple qui n’équivaut ni à un intérêt bénéficiaire ni n’implique 
l’existence d’une compétence. Il prend sa source dans la doctrine des tenures 
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et est semblable au droit de propriété que possède la Couronne, en vertu de la 
common law, sur les terres détenues en fief simple.
1. Introduction
In the principal settler states colonized by Britain where the common law 
was received—the Thirteen Colonies that became the original United States, 
Canada apart from Quebec, Australia, and New Zealand—the highest 
courts have consistently declared that the Crown acquired the underlying 
or radical title to Indian, Aboriginal, or Native title lands. However, the 
source and content of the Crown’s underlying title are somewhat obscure, 
especially in Canada. This article will examine the closely related questions 
of the source, nature, and content of this title from the perspective of the 
common law.
2. The United States: The Doctrine of Discovery and 
Underlying Title
In the United States, Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v M’Intosh relied 
on the doctrine of discovery and concluded that it gave the discovering 
European nation both sovereignty over and title to lands occupied by the 
Indian nations, whose pre-existing sovereignty was diminished but whose 
land rights continued as a burden on the underlying title of the discovering 
nation.1 He viewed this as an aspect of international law based on an 
agreement among the European nations who were engaged in overseas 
colonization, even though subsequent research has revealed that there 
1 21 US (8 Wheat) 543, 5 L Ed 681 (1823) [M’Intosh].
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2 See L Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol 1 (London, UK: Longmans, 
Green & Co, 1905) at 265; MF Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory 
in International Law (London, UK: Longmans, Green & Co, 1926); Friedrich August Freiherr 
von der Heydte, “Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International 
Law” (1935) 29:3 Am J Intl L 448; Julius Goebel, Jr, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands: 
A Study in Legal and Diplomatic History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1927) at 
47–119; John Thomas Juricek, English Claims in North America to 1660: A Study in Legal 
and Constitutional History (PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago Department of History, 
1970) [unpublished].
3 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 8 L Ed 483 (1832).
4 This acknowledgment is consistent with international law, as well as common 
law principles, whereby agreements are generally binding only on the parties thereto: Direct 
United States Cable Co Ltd v Anglo-American Telegraph Co (1877), 2 App Cas 394 at 421, 1876 
WL 18562 (WL Can) (PC); “Arbitral Award on the Subject of the Difference Relative to the 
Sovereignty over Clipperton Island” (1932) 26:2 Am J Intl L 390 at 394; Lord McNair, The Law 
of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 309–21; Charles G Fenwick, International Law, 
4th ed (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965) at 412; Malcolm N Shaw, International 
Law, 7th ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 672–74.
5 Lindsay Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed 
Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Robert J Miller 
et al, Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010).
6 M’Intosh, supra note 1 at 572; Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or, Principles of 
the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, translated 
by Joseph Chitty (London, UK: S Sweet, 1834) Book I, ch 18 at paras 204–05; John Westlake, 
International Law, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910) Part 1 at 86–90; 
Sir John Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 1924) at 554.
was no such agreement.2 Nine years later, in Worcester v Georgia,3 Chief 
Justice Marshall clarified his position by acknowledging that the doctrine 
of discovery applied only among the European nations that had agreed 
to it and could not affect the pre-existing rights of the Indian nations that 
had not agreed.4 So for the discovering nation to attain sovereignty and 
underlying title vis-à-vis the Indian nations, more was required: it had to 
actually acquire these by conquest or treaty. Although this clarification 
could have relegated the application of the doctrine of discovery to the 
European powers’ relations with one another, the doctrine in American law 
has become the foundation for the Crown’s, and hence the United States’, 
sovereignty and underlying title to Indian lands.5 
As title to land, unlike sovereignty, is generally a matter of internal 
domestic law rather than international law, and Chief Justice Marshall 
himself admitted this,6 it is unclear why he did not look for the source of the 
Crown’s underlying title in the common law. Howard Highland addressed 
this question in his Osgoode LLM thesis, Constitutional Realism and Third 
Party Property Rights in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia and Oneida 
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7 Howard Highland, Constitutional Realism and Third Party Property Rights in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia and Oneida Nation v New York (LLM Thesis, York 
University, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2011) [unpublished].
8 Ibid at 92–123.
9 [1992] HCA 23, 175 CLR 1 (Australia HC) [Mabo].
10 Ibid at paras 43–45.
11 Ibid at paras 31–34.
12 Ibid at paras 34–38.
13 Ibid at paras 46–48.
14 In the absence of interests in land held by Indigenous titleholders, private persons, 
and corporations, it has generally been held that the Crown would have not just the underlying 
or radical title, but absolute ownership: Falkland Islands Company v R (1864), 2 Moo PC (NS) 
266 at 272; R v Symonds, (1847) NZPCC 387 at 388–90, 393 (NZSC) [Symonds]; Williams 
v Attorney-General for New South Wales, [1913] HCA 33, 16 CLR 404 at 428 (Barton ACJ), 
439 (Isaacs J); Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 
at 135 [McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title]. Compare Ulla Secher, Aboriginal Customary 
Law: A Source of Common Law Title to Land (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) at 147–65, 
239–53 [Secher] (arguing that, in Australian law post-Mabo, the Crown would have only 
the radical title, rather than beneficial ownership, in this situation). Where the Crown has 
Nation v New York.7 As Highland convincingly argues, the Crown’s title to 
land in the Thirteen Colonies prior to the American Revolution should 
have been derived from the domestic law doctrine of tenure rather than the 
doctrine of discovery, but the unpopularity of feudal-based tenure in the 
American Republic would have made that explanation unpalatable for the 
Chief Justice.8
3. Australia and New Zealand: Application of the  
Doctrine of Tenure
In the other three settler states under consideration, reception of the 
common law doctrine of tenure has been taken for granted by the courts. In 
the leading Australian decision, Mabo v Queensland [No 2],9 Justice Brennan 
(as he then was) expressed this clearly by rightly separating acquisition 
of sovereignty as a matter of international law from acquisition of title to 
land in domestic law.10 He said that the British Crown acquired sovereignty 
over New South Wales by discovery and settlement, rather than discovery 
alone, and this was an act of state the legality of which cannot be questioned 
in domestic courts.11 As New South Wales had been classified in British 
colonial law as a settlement, the common law, insofar as it was applicable 
to local circumstances, was received automatically upon acquisition of 
sovereignty by the arrival of British settlers in 1788.12 Included in this 
body of common law is the feudal doctrine of tenure, by virtue of which all 
interests in land are deemed to be held of the Crown as lord paramount.13 
Another way of describing the Crown’s paramount lordship is that the 
Crown has the underlying or radical title to all lands within its dominions 
where the common law applies.14 This applies even to lands held in fee 
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absolute title, the doctrine of tenure does not apply because there is no tenant, although the 
doctrine would be invoked if the Crown chose to grant an interest. The Crown’s power to 
grant would come from its ownership, out of which it could carve an estate. For example, if 
the Crown granted a fee simple estate, the doctrine of tenure would immediately apply and 
convert the Crown’s absolute title into a paramount lordship, creating a tenurial relationship 
between the Crown and the fee simple tenant.
15 McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 14, ch 3.
16 Mabo, supra note 9 at 47. For an article supporting this argument, see Samantha 
Hepburn, “Feudal Tenure and Native Title: Revising an Enduring Fiction” (2005) 27:1 Sydney 
L Rev 49.
17 Mabo, supra note 9 at 46. For additional authority, see McNeil, Common Law 
Aboriginal Title, supra note 14 at 154, n 102.
18 Mabo, supra note 9 at 47. For detailed discussion, see Secher, supra note 14.
19 In so deciding, the High Court overruled Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty (1971), 17 FCR 
141 (NTSC). See Secher, supra note 14 at 32–33, 76–77; Simon Young, The Trouble with 
Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Sydney: Federation Press, 2008) [Young].
20 Mabo, supra note 9 at 48–51 (“The radical title is a postulate of the doctrine of 
tenure and a concomitant of sovereignty” at 48, Brennan J). I interpret this to mean that 
the doctrine of tenure gave the Crown its radical title and that the radical title accompanied 
sovereignty. For in-depth analysis, see Secher, supra note 14.
simple by private landowners: although the Crown has the underlying or 
radical title, in practical terms since the decline of feudalism all this means 
is that the land will escheat (go back) to the Crown if the fee simple owner 
dies intestate and without heirs.15
In Mabo, Justice Brennan acknowledged that it is arguable that it was 
not reasonable to apply the feudal doctrine of tenure in the Australian 
colonies.16 He noted that even in the United Kingdom there are examples 
of absolute or allodial private ownership of land, specifically on the Orkney 
and Shetland Islands where customary Udal law excludes the Crown’s 
radical title.17 But given that the doctrine of tenure had been applied from 
the outset and become the basis for landholding in Australia, he said it was 
far too late to question its application.18 However, Brennan held, and all but 
one of the High Court judges agreed, that accepting the application of the 
doctrine does not entail denying Indigenous peoples’ land rights in settled 
colonies such as Australia.19 If the Indigenous inhabitants could show that 
they had land rights under their own laws and customs at the time of Crown 
acquisition of sovereignty and the reception of the common law, those rights 
would have continued as a burden on the Crown’s underlying or radical 
title.20 Brennan expressed it this way:
Recognition of the radical title of the Crown is quite consistent with recognition of 
native title to land, for the radical title, without more, is merely a logical postulate 
required to support the doctrine of tenure (when the Crown has exercised its 
sovereign power to grant an interest in land) and to support the plenary title of 
the Crown (when the Crown has exercised its sovereign power to appropriate to 
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itself ownership of parcels of land within the Crown’s territory). Unless the sovereign 
power is exercised in one or other of those ways, there is no reason why land within 
the Crown’s territory should not continue to be subject to native title. It is only the 
fallacy of equating sovereignty and beneficial ownership of land that gives rise to the 
notion that native title is extinguished by the acquisition of sovereignty.21
Similarly in New Zealand, the Court of Appeal has held that the Crown 
acquired radical title to all land along with sovereignty, but that this 
underlying Crown title is burdened by the pre-existing land rights of the 
Maori under their customs and usages.22 Following Brennan’s judgment in 
Mabo, Chief Justice Elias stated in the leading case of Attorney General v 
Ngati Apa: “The radical title of the Crown is a technical and notional concept. 
It is not inconsistent with common law recognition of native property.”23
4. Canada: The Source of the Crown’s Underlying Title
In Canada outside of Quebec, the doctrine of tenure has also been regarded 
as having been received along with other applicable common law doctrines 
and rules.24 As a result, the Crown is deemed to have received the underlying 
title to all land at the time sovereignty was acquired and the common law 
was introduced. If this is what Chief Justice Dickson and Justice La Forest 
21 Mabo, supra note 9 at 50–51. Note that Justice Brennan’s view that the Crown 
could exercise its sovereign power to grant land or appropriate land to itself was a pragmatic 
compromise meant to protect existing property rights in Australia, where the Crown did not 
enter into treaties for the surrender of Native title. It is not consistent with the protection 
the common law accords to property rights generally: Kent McNeil, “Racial Discrimination 
and Unilateral Extinguishment of Native Title” (1996) 1:2 Australian Indigenous L Reporter 
181 [McNeil, “Racial Discrimination”], reprinted in Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays 
on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan 
Native Law Centre, 2001) 357 [McNeil, Emerging Justice?]; Secher, supra note 14 at 122–28. 
In Canada, exercise of equivalent sovereign power would require clear and plain statutory 
authority, and would be subject to the constitutional division of powers and the protection 
provided to Aboriginal title by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982: Kent McNeil, 
“Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial Discretion” 
(2001) 33:2 Ottawa L Rev 301 [McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title”].
22 AG v Ngati Apa, [2003] NZCA 117, [2003] 3 NZLR 643 [Ngati Apa]; Young, supra 
note 19 at 167–200.
23 Ngati Apa, supra note 22 at para 30. See also Symonds, supra note 14; Nireaha 
Tamaki v Baker, [1901] AC 561, [1901] NZPC 1 (PC) [Nireaha Tamaki]. For discussion, 
see Secher, supra note 14 at 59–78; Kent McNeil, “Legal Rights and Legislative Wrongs: 
Maori Claims to the Foreshore and Seabed” in Andrew Erueti & Claire Charters, eds, Maori 
Property Rights and the Foreshore and Seabed: The Last Frontier (Wellington, NZ: Victoria 
University Press, 2007) 83.
24 Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 67–71; 
Mary Jane Mossman & Philip Girard, Property Law: Cases and Commentary, 3rd ed (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 2014) at 229–35, 240–41.
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meant in R v Sparrow when they stated, in reference to lands burdened by 
Aboriginal title in British Columbia, that “there was from the outset never 
any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying 
title, to such lands vested in the Crown,”25 it would be consistent with the 
decisions of the High Court of Australia and the Court of Appeal of New 
Zealand in the cases discussed above. However, the authority upon which 
Dickson and La Forest relied, in addition to the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
was Johnson v M’Intosh, where we have seen that the Crown’s underlying title 
was taken to have been derived from the doctrine of discovery.26 In Guerin v 
Canada, Justice Dickson (as he then was) also relied on Johnson v M’Intosh 
in deciding that the Crown has the underlying title to Aboriginal title lands 
in Canada.27 He additionally relied on St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber 
Co v R,28 where the Privy Council regarded the Crown’s underlying title to 
Treaty 3 lands in northwestern Ontario as having been acquired by cession 
of French Canada to Britain by the Treaty of Paris in 1763.29 The sources 
of the Crown’s underlying title have therefore been variously suggested to 
be the common law, the doctrine of discovery, and in the former French 
colonies, cession from France.
The Supreme Court of Canada has provided little insight into the 
source of the Crown’s underlying title. In my opinion, a more doctrinally 
accurate explanation was provided by Justice Campbell in his trial decision 
in Chippewas of Sarnia v Canada (AG), where he observed the accepted 
position that the underlying title is in the Crown “is simply a basic 
proposition of English and Canadian property law that applies to all land.”30 
He elaborated as follows:
As demonstrated earlier it is axiomatic in our common law system that the 
underlying, allodial, or radical title in Indian land, like all land is indeed vested in the 
Crown. But that title is subject to the overlying burden of Indian title. That overlying 
burden of Indian title is not vested in the Crown but guaranteed by the Crown to the 
Indians until surrendered by the Indians to the Crown.31
The Supreme Court returned to the issue of the Crown’s underlying title in 
Delgamuukw v British Columbia,32 where Chief Justice Lamer stated:
25 [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1103, 46 BCLR (2d) 1 [Sparrow]. For critical commentary, 
see Michael Asch and Patrick Macklem, “Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An 
Essay on R. v. Sparrow” (1991) 29:2 Alta L Rev 498.
26 M’Intosh, supra note 1 at 573.
27 [1984] 2 SCR 335 at 377–379, 59 BCLR 301 [Guerin].
28 [1888] UKPC 70, 14 App Cas 46 [St Catherine’s cited to App Cas].
29 Guerin, supra note 27 at 380.
30 (1999), 88 ACWS (3d) 728, 40 RPR (3d) 49 at para 377 (ONSC), rev’d on other 
grounds (2001), 51 OR (3d) 641, 195 DLR (4th) 135.
31 Ibid at para 419.
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Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title. However, the Crown 
did not gain this title until it asserted sovereignty over the land in question. Because 
it does not make sense to speak of a burden on the underlying title before that title 
existed, aboriginal title crystallized at the time sovereignty was asserted.33
The Supreme Court accepted that the Crown asserted sovereignty over the 
territories of the Wet’suwet’en and Gitksan nations in 1846 when it entered 
the Oregon Boundary Treaty with the United States. The source of the 
Crown’s underlying title in British Columbia was therefore not discovery, 
which had occurred prior to 1846.34 Instead, it appears that the Crown 
acquired sovereignty, and hence underlying title, by unilateral assertion and 
international acknowledgement thereof by a bilateral treaty with another 
sovereign, the United States.35 Acceptance of 1846 as the year for assertion 
of Crown sovereignty and the vesting of Aboriginal title in that province was 
recently affirmed by Chief Justice McLachlin in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British 
Columbia.36
5. The Nature of the Crown’s Underlying Title in Canada
It is important to understand that the Crown’s underlying title is a 
property right derived from the doctrine of tenure, rather than a source of 
jurisdiction (governmental authority), because this means that it is subject 
to the common law protections accorded to other real property rights by 
the common law. In the St Catherine’s case, the Privy Council decided 
that the Crown had the underlying title to lands within Ontario that were 
burdened by Aboriginal title prior to the surrender of that title to the Crown 
by treaty.37 The province received the beneficial interest in those lands after 
the surrender as a result of section 109 of the British North America Act, 
1867 (now the Constitution Act, 1867), which provides that, subject to the 
exceptions referred to in sections 108 and 117, public lands and resources 
belong to the provinces.38 The provincial interest is “subject to any Trusts 
32 [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 66 BCLR (3d) 285 [Delgamuukw cited to SCR].
33 Ibid at para 145.
34 See Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at paras 585–602, 
[2008] 1 CNLR 112. In that case Justice Vickers rejected discovery as a means for Crown 
acquisition of sovereignty, but accepted 1846 as the appropriate year in British Columbia.
35 For critical commentary, see Kent McNeil, “Negotiated Sovereignty: Indian 
Treaties and the Acquisition of American and Canadian Territorial Rights in the Pacific 
Northwest” in Alexandra Harmon, ed, The Power of Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in 
the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008) 35 [McNeil, “Negotiated 
Sovereignty”].
36 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 257 [Tsilhqot’in Nation].
37 St Catherine’s, supra note 28 at 58.
38 Section 108 provides that the property listed in the third schedule to the Act, 
including canals, public harbors, lighthouses, railways, customs houses, military equipment 
and installations, “shall be the Property of Canada,” whereas section 117 empowers Canada 
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existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other than that of the Province 
in the same.”39 Section 109 is thus one of the provisions in the Act dealing 
with the division of public property between the provinces and the federal 
government; it is not concerned with the division of powers (legislative and 
executive jurisdiction), which is provided for by other sections, especially 
sections 91 and 92.
In St Catherine’s, the Privy Council held that Aboriginal title is an 
“Interest other than that of the Province” within the meaning of section 
109, and so the lands burdened by that title did not become available to 
the province as a source of revenue until the burden of that title had been 
removed in 1873 by Treaty 3.40 As Aboriginal title is a property right along 
with the other interests preserved by section 109, such as fee simple estates, 
it must enjoy the same common law protections as those other property 
rights.41 Specifically, in the parliamentary system of government that 
Canada received from Britain, legal rights can only be infringed or taken 
away by or pursuant to unequivocal legislation. This is particularly so where 
property rights are concerned, as they have always enjoyed special protection 
in the common law.42 The rule against executive taking with respect to 
land dates from at least 1215, when chapter 29 of Magna Carta specified 
that “[n]o Freeman shall … be disseised [i.e., dispossessed of his land] … 
but by the lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the law of the Land.”43 This 
to assume any provincial property “required for Fortifications or for the Defence of the 
Country.” Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c3.
39 Section 109 provides in full: “All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging 
to the several Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick at the Union, and all 
Sums then due or payable for such Lands, Mines, Minerals, or Royalties, shall belong to the 
several Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick in which the same 
are situate or arise, subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other 
than that of the Province in the same”. 
40 Supra note 28 at 58–59.
41 The remainder of this paragraph is excerpted from McNeil, “Extinguishment of 
Aboriginal Title”, supra note 21 at 309–10. For a more detailed discussion, see McNeil, “Racial 
Discrimination”, supra note 21 at 182–90 (Emerging Justice? at 359–69).
42 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 1 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1765) at 129; Herbert Broom, Constitutional Law Viewed in Relation to 
Common Law and Exemplified by Cases, 2nd ed by George L Denman (London, UK: W 
Maxwell & Son, 1885) at 225–45 [Broom]; Harrison v Carswell, [1976] 2 SCR 200 at 219, 
62 DLR (3d) 68, Dickson J; Leiriao v Val-Bélair (Town), [1991] 3 SCR 349 at 356–57, 29 
ACWS (3d) 1112, L’Heureux-Dubé J (dissenting). For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, 
“Aboriginal Title as a Constitutionally Protected Property Right” in Emerging Justice?, supra 
note 21 at 292, 293–95 [McNeil, “Constitutionally Protected Property Right”].
43 Magna Carta (UK), 16 John. In AG v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd, [1920] UKHL 
1, [1920] AC 508 at 569, Lord Parmoor stated: “Since Magna Carta the estate of a subject 
in lands or buildings has been protected against the prerogative of the Crown” [De Keyser’s 
Royal Hotel]. 
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restraint on the authority of the executive branch of government is basic to 
the rule of law,44 as it protects property against government taking except 
in accordance with law.45 Simply put, it means that there is no prerogative 
power to confiscate or extinguish property rights in times of peace.46 Any 
executive authority to take or extinguish property rights must, therefore, 
be created by legislation because only legislatures have the constitutional 
authority to interfere with property rights.47
The proprietary nature of the Crown’s underlying title and the common 
law protection against executive taking provided to Aboriginal title were 
both confirmed by the Supreme Court in the Delgamuukw decision.48 
In that case, British Columbia tried to rely on the fact that section 109 
gives the Crown’s underlying title to the province in arguing that “this 
right of ownership carried with it the right to grant fee simples which, by 
implication, extinguish aboriginal title.”49 Chief Justice Lamer concluded 
that this argument failed “to take account of the language of s.109”:
Although that provision vests underlying title in provincial Crowns, it qualifies 
provincial ownership by making it subject to “any Interest other than that of 
the Province in the same”. In St. Catherine’s Milling, the Privy Council held that 
aboriginal title was such an interest, and rejected the argument that provincial 
ownership operated as a limit on federal jurisdiction. The net effect of that decision, 
44 Entick v Carrington, [1765] EWHC KB J98, [1765] 19 St Tr 1030 (CP).
45 In Eshugbayi Eleko v Government of Nigeria, [1931] UKPC 37, [1931] AC 662 at 
670, Lord Atkin stated: “no member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property 
of a British subject except on the condition that he can support the legality of his action 
before a court of justice.” See also James W Ely, Jr, The Guardian of Every Other Right: A 
Constitutional History of Property Rights, 2nd ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
at 13–14, 54–55.
46 In wartime the Crown can take private property for defense purposes, but only 
if compensation is paid: See De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, supra note 43; Commercial and Estates 
Co of Egypt v Board of Trade, [1925] 1 KB 271 at 294–97, [1925] LI LR 218 (CA) Atkin LJ; 
Burmah Oil Co v Lord Advocate, [1964] UKHL 6, [1965] AC 75.
47  Broom, supra note 42 at 231: “no man’s property can legally be taken from 
him or invaded by the direct act or command of the sovereign, without the consent of the 
subject, given expressly or impliedly through parliament.” Where land is concerned, modern 
expropriation statutes are the main source of this kind of executive authority: Keith Davies, 
Law of Compulsory Purchase and Compensation, 3rd ed (London, UK: Butterworths, 1978) 
at 9–10; Graham L Fricke, ed, Compulsory Acquisition of Land in Australia, 2nd ed (Sydney: 
Law Book Company Limited, 1982) at 5–6; Eric CE Todd, The Law of Expropriation and 
Compensation in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 26–29; Rugby Joint Water 
Board v Shaw Fox, [1972] 2 WLR 757, [1973] AC 202 (HL) at 214 (Lord Pearson stated that 
“compulsory acquisition and compensation for it are entirely creations of statute”).
48 Delgamuukw, supra note 32 at paras 160–169, 189.
49 Ibid at para 175.
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therefore, was to separate the ownership of lands held pursuant to aboriginal title 
from jurisdiction over those lands.50
Thus, the province’s underlying title is a property interest that is subject 
to other property interests, including Aboriginal title. It does not give 
the province any jurisdiction over Aboriginal title lands. This is entirely 
consistent with the common law position that the Crown’s underlying title 
to all lands does not carry with it jurisdiction to extinguish or diminish any 
property rights that burden the underlying title.
In spite of Chief Justice Lamer’s clear ruling on this issue in Delgamuukw, 
in Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), British Columbia 
again contended that section 109 gave the province the “exclusive right” 
to lands burdened by Aboriginal title, and argued that this right “cannot 
be limited by the protection for Aboriginal rights found in s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.”51 The province contended that, as a result, any duty 
to consult for potential infringements of Aboriginal title rested solely with 
the federal government.52 Chief Justice McLachlin summarily dismissed 
these contentions and held that the provinces have a duty to consult when 
they propose action that may negatively impact asserted Aboriginal title:
The answer to this argument is that the Provinces took their interest in land subject 
to “any Interest other than that of the Province in the same” (s. 109). The duty to 
consult and accommodate here at issue is grounded in the assertion of Crown 
sovereignty which pre-dated the Union. It follows that the Province took the lands 
subject to this duty. It cannot therefore claim that s. 35 deprives it of powers it would 
otherwise have enjoyed. As stated in St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. The 
Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.), lands in the Province are “available to [the 
Province] as a source of revenue whenever the estate of the Crown is disencumbered 
of the Indian title” (p. 59). The Crown’s argument on this point has been canvassed 
by this Court in Delgamuukw, supra, at para. 175, where Lamer C.J. reiterated the 
conclusions in St. Catherine’s Milling, supra. There is therefore no foundation to the 
Province’s argument on this point.53
Clearly, then, the provinces’ underlying title does not carry with it authority 
to infringe Aboriginal title in the same way as the Crown’s underlying title 
to fee simple lands does not carry with it any authority to infringe the rights 
of fee simple owners. If the provinces have authority to infringe Aboriginal 
title, it must be legislative authority derived from the division of powers in 
the Constitution Act, 1867, not from the division of property in that Act.
50 Ibid.
51 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 at para 58 [Haida Nation].
52 Ibid at para 57.
53 Ibid at para 59.
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6. The Content of the Crown’s Underlying Title in Canada
The content of the Crown’s underlying title at common law is what is left 
after the rights of private persons and Aboriginal titleholders are subtracted 
from the totality of property rights that pertain to the land in question. In 
principle, this approach should apply in each of the four settler states. This 
approach is at least implicit in the case law in Australia and New Zealand.54 
However, in the United States the Supreme Court has regarded the fee simple 
to Indian title lands to be vested by the doctrine of discovery in the Crown 
and its successor, which in this context could be either the United States or 
a state government, though this fee simple is equivalent to a remainder that 
does not include a right to possession until the Indian title has been validly 
extinguished.55 Alternatively, in their own legal orders, some Indigenous 
peoples may be the absolute or allodial owners of their lands, rendering 
the Crown’s underlying title nonexistent, as nothing would remain after the 
land rights of the Indigenous peoples were subtracted.56
In this article, my main concern is with the content of the Crown’s 
underlying title in Canada from the perspective of the Supreme Court. 
Prior to the Delgamuukw decision in 1997, the Court had not shed much 
light on this matter, no doubt because it had not provided a definition of 
the Aboriginal title that has to be subtracted from the underlying title.57 
However, in Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer described Aboriginal title 
as a “right to the land itself ” that could “compete on an equal footing with 
other proprietary interests.”58 Elaborating, he stated:
54 Western Australia v Ward (2002), 191 ALR 1, 213 CLR 1; Ngati Apa, supra note 22. 
For detailed discussion, see Secher, supra note 14 at 59–78 (regarding New Zealand), 147–64 
(regarding Australia).
55 Fletcher v Peck, 10 US (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), 3 L Ed 162; M’Intosh, supra note 
1; Mitchel v United States, 34 US (9 Pet) 711, 9 L Ed 283 (1835) at 745–46, 9 L Ed 283. For 
discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Extinguishment of Native Title: The High Court and American 
Law” (1997) 2:3 Australian Indigenous L Reporter 365, reprinted in Emerging Justice?, supra 
note 21 at 409. 
56 See e.g. James [sákéj] Youngblood Henderson, “Mikmaw Tenure in Atlantic 
Canada” (1995) 18:2 Dal LJ 196 [Henderson, “Mikmaw Tenure”]; John Borrows, “The 
Durability of Terra Nullius: Tsilhqot’in v The Queen” (2015) 48:3 UBC L Rev 701 [Borrows]. 
In relation to Australia, see Brendan Edgeworth, “Tenure, Allodialism and Indigenous Rights 
at Common Law: English, United States and Australian Land Law Compared after Mabo v. 
Queensland” (1994) 23:4 Anglo-Am L Rev 397.
57 McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 14 at 276–90. In the St 
Catherine’s case, supra note 28, the Privy Council described the Crown’s underlying title as 
“a substantial and paramount estate” (at 55) and “a present proprietary estate in the land” 
(at 58), but, as their Lordships found it unnecessary to define Aboriginal title precisely, the 
content of the Crown’s underlying title was also left vague.
58 Delgamuukw, supra note 32 at paras 112, 138, 140, 113. Chief Justice Lamer relied 
upon Canadian Pacific Ltd v Paul, [1988] 2 SCR 654 at 677, 91 NBR (2d) 43.
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59 Delgamuukw, supra note 32 at para 111.
60 Ibid at paras 118–24.
61 Supra note 36 at para 69.
62 Ibid at para 70.
63 Delgamuukw, supra note 32 at para 113; Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 36 at para 
74. Another sui generis aspect of Aboriginal title is that it is subject to an inherent limit that 
Aboriginal title is a right in land and, as such, is more than the right to engage in 
specific activities which may be themselves aboriginal rights. Rather, it confers 
the right to use land for a variety of activities, not all of which need be aspects of 
practices, customs and traditions which are integral to the distinctive cultures of 
aboriginal societies.59
He went on to conclude that Aboriginal title comprises natural resources, 
including subsurface resources such as oil and gas, even if those resources 
had not been known to or used by the Aboriginal titleholders prior to the 
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty.60
In Tsilhqot’in Nation, Chief Justice McLachlin affirmed that the Crown’s 
underlying title was acquired along with sovereignty:
At the time of assertion of European sovereignty, the Crown acquired radical or 
underlying title to all the land in the province. This Crown title, however, was 
burdened by the pre-existing legal rights of Aboriginal people who occupied and 
used the land prior to European arrival. The doctrine of terra nullius (that no one 
owned the land prior to European assertion of sovereignty) never applied in Canada, 
as confirmed by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Aboriginal interest in land that 
burdens the Crown’s underlying title is an independent legal interest, which gives 
rise to a fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown.61
She also affirmed that Aboriginal title amounts to the entire beneficial 
interest in the land:
The content of the Crown’s underlying title is what is left when Aboriginal title is 
subtracted from it: s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867; Delgamuukw. As we have 
seen, Delgamuukw establishes that Aboriginal title gives “the right to exclusive use 
and occupation of the land ... for a variety of purposes”, not confined to traditional or 
“distinctive” uses (para. 117). In other words, Aboriginal title is a beneficial interest 
in the land: Guerin, at p. 382. In simple terms, the title holders have the right to the 
benefits associated with the land—to use it, enjoy it and profit from its economic 
development. As such, the Crown does not retain a beneficial interest in Aboriginal 
title land.62
However, Aboriginal title is unlike common law real property interests such 
as fee simple estates, in part because it is inalienable other than by surrender 
to the Crown.63 This restriction on alienation has been described in New 
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Zealand as a Crown right of pre-emption, but whether it stems from the 
Crown’s underlying title or some other source is unclear.64 My own view is 
that it is neither a restriction inherent in Aboriginal title itself nor a Crown 
right of pre-emption, but rather a restriction on the ability of settlers to 
acquire lands directly from the Aboriginal titleholders. In Australia and New 
Zealand, the courts have held that, due to the doctrine of tenure, settlers can 
acquire real property rights only from the Crown.65 However, I think there 
is an additional explanation for this settler incapacity. In Campbell v British 
Columbia (AG), Justice Williamson held that Aboriginal title is more than 
mere property—it has governmental dimensions as well.66 It should follow 
that Aboriginal title cannot be acquired by private persons or corporations, 
as they lack the legal capacity to acquire governmental authority from 
anyone other than the Crown.67 Consequently, only the Crown and, 
prevents the land from being “encumbered in ways that would prevent future generations 
of the group from using and enjoying it” or “developed or misused in a way that would 
substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the land”: Tsilhqot’in Nation at para 
74. For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, “The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and Content 
of Aboriginal Title” in Emerging Justice?, supra note 21 at 102. Significantly, this inherent 
limit also applies to the Crown, restricting its ability to justify infringements of Aboriginal 
title: Tsilhqot’in Nation at para 86. See Brian Slattery, “The Constitutional Dimensions of 
Aboriginal Title” (2015) 71:1 SCLR 45 at 58–63 [Slattery, “Constitutional Dimensions”]. 
Justifiable infringement is discussed briefly below.
64 Symonds, supra note 14; Nireaha Tamaki, supra note 23. For discussion, see Secher, 
supra note 14 at 60–67, 71–75.
65 Symonds, supra note 14; Mabo, supra note 9. However, this explanation is not 
consistent with the common law doctrine of adverse possession, whereby private persons can 
acquire real property rights (even against the Crown in some instances) by possession for the 
statutory limitation period: John M Lightwood, The Time Limit on Actions, Being a Treatise 
on the Statute of Limitations and the Equitable Doctrine of Laches (London, UK: Butterworth 
& Co, 1909); McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 14 at 87–92; Secher, supra 
note 14 at 126.
66 2000 BCSC 1123, [2000] 4 CNLR 1 at 37–38. In House of Sga’nisim v Canada 
(AG), 2011 BCSC 1394, [2012] 2 CNLR 82, Justice Smith followed Campbell out of comity, 
but also held that the governmental authority in the Nisga’a Final Agreement, 1998, the 
validity of which was challenged in these cases, could be upheld as having been delegated 
by the agreement. Smith’s decision was upheld on this basis, without deciding the inherent 
right issue: 2013 BCCA 49, [2013] 2 CNLR 226. For further discussion, see Brian Slattery, 
“Constitutional Dimensions”, supra note 63; Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Land Rights and Self-
Government: Inseparable Entitlements” in Lisa Ford & Tim Rowse, eds, Between Indigenous 
and Settler Governance (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013) 135; Jeremy Webber, “The Public-
Law Dimension of Indigenous Property Rights” in Nigel Bankes & Timo Koivurova, eds, 
The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention: National and International Dimensions of Indigenous 
Property Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 79; Joshua Nichols, “A Reconciliation 
Without Recollection? Chief Mountain and the Sources of Sovereignty” (2015) 48:2 UBC L 
Rev 515.
67 For an example of Crown conferral of governmental authority on a corporation, 
see the Rupert’s Land Charter, 1670, whereby Charles II granted extensive governmental 
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authority in North America to the Hudson’s Bay Company. The Charter is reproduced in 
EE Rich, ed, Minutes of the Hudson’s Bay Company 1671-1674 (Toronto: Champlain Society, 
1942) at 131–48.
68 Technically, when Aboriginal title is surrendered to the Crown by treaty, the 
burden of that title is removed from the Crown’s underlying title, which expands into what 
Lord Watson called “a plenum dominium”: St Catherine’s, supra note 28 at 55. Transfer 
ofAboriginal title from one group to another was envisaged by Justice La Forest in his 
concurring judgment in Delgamuukw, supra note 32 at para 198.
69 Chief Justice Marshall envisaged this in M’Intosh, supra note 1 at 593. For further 
discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title” 
(2002) 47:3 McGill LJ 473.
70 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 36 at para 71.
71 Delgamuukw, supra note 32 at para 113.
72 See McNeil, “Constitutionally Protected Property Right”, supra note 42 at 292.
73 As decided in Guerin, supra note 27, the Crown’s fiduciary obligations arise in part 
from the inalienability, other than by surrender to the Crown, of Aboriginal title and reserve 
lands, which gives the Crown discretionary power. But in Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 36 
at para 112, Chief Justice McLachlin stated that, “although Aboriginal title can be alienated 
arguably, other Indigenous nations can acquire Aboriginal title directly 
from the titleholders.68 However, this should not prevent the titleholders 
from creating lesser property interests in their title lands under their own 
laws, as long as they retain Aboriginal title itself and the jurisdiction that it 
entails.69
Returning to Tsilhqot’in Nation, after concluding that the Crown’s 
underlying title has no beneficial content, Chief Justice McLachlin 
continued:
What remains, then, of the Crown’s radical or underlying title to lands held under 
Aboriginal title? The authorities suggest two related elements – a fiduciary duty 
owed by the Crown to Aboriginal people when dealing with Aboriginal lands, 
and the right to encroach on Aboriginal title if the government can justify this in 
the broader public interest under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Court in 
Delgamuukw referred to this as a process of reconciling Aboriginal interests with the 
broader public interests under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.70
With respect, the power to encroach on Aboriginal title in the broader 
public interest by infringement cannot come from the Crown’s underlying 
title, which is purely proprietary. We have also seen that Aboriginal title 
is a property interest that can “compete on an equal footing with other 
proprietary interests.”71 It must therefore enjoy at least the same protection as 
the common law accords to other property rights, and arguably even greater 
protection because, unlike other property rights, it has been constitutionally 
protected in Canada since 1982 by section 35.72 In addition, McLachlin 
affirmed that the Crown owes unique fiduciary obligations to Indigenous 
peoples in relation to their lands.73 Even apart from these special protections, 
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it is fundamental in the constitutional system that Canada inherited from 
the United Kingdom that the Crown does not have prerogative authority 
to infringe property rights.74 As we have seen, since at least Magna Carta 
the Crown has been unable to infringe real property rights by virtue of its 
underlying title to all lands within its common law dominions. The only 
way it can legally infringe property rights, excluding times of war, is if it 
has clear and plain statutory authority to do so, such as that provided by 
expropriation legislation.75
In keeping with fundamental constitutional principles, the Crown’s 
power to infringe, which the Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation decided pertains 
to both the federal and provincial Crowns,76 can come only from the 
legislative authority conferred on Parliament and the provincial legislatures 
by sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. This means that, before 
any infringement can justifiably take place, legislation must be enacted 
that infringes Aboriginal title directly or gives the executive branch the 
authority to do so. Of course, infringement in these ways will still not be 
constitutionally valid unless the Crown is able to justify the infringement in 
accordance with the Sparrow test, as narrowed by Chief Justice McLachlin’s 
judgment in Tsilhqot’in Nation,77 by proving a valid legislative objective, 
adequate consultation, minimal impairment of Aboriginal title, and 
compensation in appropriate circumstances.78
to the Crown, this does not confer a fixed right to future enjoyment in the way property 
that is vested in interest would. Rather, it would seem that Aboriginal title vests the lands in 
question in the Aboriginal group.” In other words, the Crown’s right to acquire Aboriginal 
title lands by surrender does not entail a vested proprietary interest in the lands.
74 See the Preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 38: “Whereas the 
Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be 
federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom”.
75 See the authorities cited in notes 42–47 above.
76 This ruling involved a rejection of the application of the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity to section 35 rights. For critical commentary, see Kerry Wilkins, 
“Life Among the Ruins: Section 91(24) after Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows” (2017) 55:1 Alta 
L Rev 91 [Wilkins, “Life Among the Ruins”]; HW Roger Townshend, “What Changes Did 
Grassy Narrows First Nation Make to Federalism and Other Doctrines?” (2017) 95:2 Can Bar 
Rev 459.
77 As mentioned in note 63 above, Chief Justice McLachlin stated the inherent limit 
on Aboriginal title also applies to the Crown, so infringements that would substantially 
deprive future generations of the benefit of the land cannot be justified: Tsilhqot’in Nation, 
supra note 36 at para 86. Moreover, McLachlin stated that “the Crown must seek the consent 
of the title-holding Aboriginal group to developments on the land” before proceeding 
unilaterally and attempting to justify its actions, at para 90. I am grateful to Kerry Wilkins for 
pointing this out to me.
78 Sparrow, supra note 25; Delgamuukw, supra note 32 at paras 160–69; Tsilhqot’in 
Nation, supra note 36 at paras 77–88.
The Source, Nature, and Content of the Crown’s Underlying …2018] 289
7. Conclusion: Sovereignty and Underlying Title in Canada
It is essential to separate sovereignty from title to land in the Crown’s 
overseas dominions. Focusing on Canada, it appears that the Crown got 
sovereignty over Acadia and New France from the French King by conquest 
and cession,79 though this leaves unanswered the question of how France 
acquired sovereignty over territories occupied and controlled by Indigenous 
peoples.80 The geographical extent of France’s North American possessions is 
also an open question.81 In the rest of Canada, various terms have been used 
to explain Crown acquisition of sovereignty, such as discovery, settlement, 
and assertion. Recognition of Crown sovereignty by a single neighboring 
nation, the United States, has been taken as adequate for the Crown to have 
acquired sovereignty over British Columbia. Then, in Haida Nation,82 the 
Supreme Court acknowledged pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty for the 
first time. It referred to Crown sovereignty and control as “assumed” and 
“de facto”,83 without any explanation of how the Crown could have de facto 
sovereignty over territories that were completely occupied and controlled 
by Indigenous peoples before and for some time after the Crown’s supposed 
acquisition of sovereignty in 1846.84 If the Crown acquired sovereignty over 
all of British Columbia at that time, then as I have previously argued it can 
79 Regarding New France, see St Catherine’s, supra note 28. Regarding French 
colonies in what became Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, see R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 
2005 SCC 43, [2005] 2 SCR 220 at para 71, relying on the lower courts’ decisions.
80 Michel Morin, L’Usurpation de la souveraineté autochtone: Le cas des peuples de la 
Nouvelle-France et des colonies anglaises de l’Amérique du Nord (Montreal: Éditions Boréal, 
1997); Michel Morin, “Des nations libres sans territoire? Les Autochtones et la colonisation 
de l’Amérique française du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle” (2010) 12:1 J History Intl L 1; Brian 
Slattery, French Claims in North America 1500-59 (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan 
Native Law Centre, 1980); Brian Slattery, “Paper Empires: The Legal Dimensions of French 
and English Ventures in North America” in John McLaren, AR Buck & Nancy E Wright, eds, 
Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) 
50; Luc Huppé, “L’établissement de la souveraineté européenne au Canada” (2009) 50:1 C de 
D 153 [Huppé].
81 Huppé, supra note 80 at 155–56; Kent McNeil, Native Rights and the Boundaries 
of Rupert’s Land and the North-Western Territory (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan 
Native Law Centre, 1982).
82 Haida Nation, supra note 51.
83 Ibid at paras 20, 32. See also Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia 
(Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 SCR 550, handed down the same day as 
Haida Nation, at para 42, where Chief Justice McLachlin, for a unanimous Court, stated: “The 
purpose of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 is to facilitate the ultimate reconciliation of 
prior Aboriginal occupation with de facto Crown sovereignty. Pending settlement, the Crown 
is bound by its honour to balance societal and Aboriginal interests in making decisions that 
may affect Aboriginal claims”.
84 Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: 
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2012).
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only have been de jure, and only in legal systems that would acknowledge 
Crown sovereignty—such as British colonial law and possibly international 
law, but not Indigenous law.85
Nonetheless, one cannot deny the reality that the Crown did eventually 
acquire de facto sovereignty over all of Canada, and probably obtained 
de jure sovereignty in domestic Canadian law as well as in international 
law.86 However, apart from French Canada, the source of the Crown’s de 
jure sovereignty has never been adequately explained by any branch of 
the Canadian government—judicial, executive, or legislative. Perhaps de 
facto sovereignty has resulted in gradual acquisition of de jure sovereignty 
domestically and internationally by prescription, but this does not 
explain how pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty could have been legally 
superseded by Crown sovereignty without conquest, cession, or Indigenous 
acquiescence.87 Crown sovereignty, even if legal in Euro-based juridical 
systems, therefore lacks legitimacy because it depends on the application of 
those legal systems to Indigenous peoples without their consent, and without 
taking account of their pre-existing sovereignty and laws.88 Indigenous 
peoples, in both treaty and non-treaty areas, continue to assert that they 
never gave up their sovereignty and that mutually respectful negotiations 
85 McNeil, “Negotiated Sovereignty”, supra note 35; Kent McNeil, “The Doctrine 
of Discovery Reconsidered: Reflecting on Robert J Miller, Jacinta Ruru, Larissa Behrendt, 
and Tracey Lindberg, Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English 
Colonies, and Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada” (2016) 
53:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 699 [McNeil, “Discovery Reconsidered”]. For further discussion of the 
relativity and limited scope of European and American assertions of sovereignty in North 
America, see Kent McNeil, “Factual and Legal Sovereignty in North America: Indigenous 
Realities and Euro-American Pretensions” in Julie Evans et al, eds, Sovereignty: Frontiers of 
Possibility (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2013) 37; Kent McNeil, “Sovereignty and 
Indigenous Peoples in North America” (2016) 22:2 U California Davis J Intl L & Policy 81. 
86 International recognition of Canada as a nation-state and a member of the United 
Nations would support Crown sovereignty internationally. Canada’s asserted territorial 
extent also seems to be generally accepted, with a few exceptions such as the North-West 
Passage in the Arctic.
87 Internationally, at least, prescription appears to depend on acquiescence by the 
displaced sovereign: DHN Johnson, “Acquisitive Prescription in International Law” (1950) 
27:1 Brit YB Intl L 332; RY Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963) at 20–28; Yehuda Z Blum, Historic Titles in 
International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1965) at 6–37; Surya P Sharma, 
Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1997) at 107–19; Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal 
Rights in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 38–41.
88 McNeil, “Discovery Reconsidered”, supra note 85; Felix Hoehn, “Back to the 
Future: Reconciliation and Indigenous Sovereignty after Tsilhqot’in” (2016) 67 UNBLJ 109.
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need to occur so that sovereignty can be shared.89 In Haida Nation, the 
Supreme Court seemed to acknowledge this. Chief Justice McLachlin stated:
Where treaties remain to be concluded, the honour of the Crown requires 
negotiations leading to a just settlement of Aboriginal claims: R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 
1 S.C.R. 1075, at pp. 1105-6. Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal 
sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal rights 
guaranteed by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35 represents a promise 
of rights recognition, and “[i]t is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its 
promises” (Badger, supra, at para. 41). This promise is realized and sovereignty claims 
reconciled through the process of honourable negotiation. It is a corollary of s. 35 that 
the Crown act honourably in defining the rights it guarantees and in reconciling 
them with other rights and interests. This, in turn, implies a duty to consult and, if 
appropriate, accommodate.90
Assuming that the Crown acquired de jure sovereignty in domestic Canadian 
law over the parts of Canada not acquired from France, applicable common 
law would have been received automatically at the same time.91 As we have 
seen, it has been generally accepted that the doctrine of tenure was included 
in this received body of law, which is how the Crown obtained its underlying 
title. However, as discussed above, this is a property interest that has been 
89 See e.g. Henderson, “Mikmaw Tenure”, supra note 56; Borrows, supra note 56; 
Harold Cardinal & Walter Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is That 
Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized as Nations (Calgary: University of Calgary 
Press, 2000); James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in the Constitution of 
Canada (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007); Gordon Christie, “Who Makes Decisions over 
Aboriginal Title Lands?” (2015) 48:3 UBC L Rev 743 at 787–92; Shiri Pasternak, Grounded 
Authority: The Algonquins of Barrier Lake Against the State (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2017); Arthur Manuel & Grand Chief Ronald Derrickson, The 
Reconciliation Manifesto: Recovering the Land and Rebuilding the Economy (Toronto: James 
Lorimer & Company, 2017).
90 Haida Nation, supra note 51 at para 20 [emphasis added].
91 According to long-standing doctrines of British colonial law, in settled colonies the 
common law, to the extent it is applicable to local circumstances, is automatically received: 
McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 14 at 134–35, 274–75; Sir Kenneth 
Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1966) at 544–57; 
JE Côté, “The Reception of English Law” (1977) 15:1 Alta L Rev 29. However, this does not 
mean that Indigenous law was displaced: Connolly v Woolrich (1867) 17 RJRQ 75, 1 CNLC 
70 (Qc SC), aff ’d 17 RJRQ 266, 1 CNLC 151 (Qc CA). For this reason, as Brian Slattery has 
reminded me, instead of being classified as “settled” (a classification that really could only 
apply to uninhabited territories), the areas of Canada not acquired by the Crown from France 
would more appropriately come within a mixed category where the English settlers brought 
the common law with them but local law continued to apply to the Indigenous inhabitants: 
Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, as Affected by the Crown’s 
Acquisition of Their Territories (D Phil dissertation, Oxford University, 1979) at 10–24, 
online: <works.bepress.com/brian_slattery/24/>.
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burdened from the outset by Aboriginal title—it has no present beneficial 
content and does not give the Crown any authority to extinguish or infringe 
Aboriginal title. The underlying title only amounts to a right to obtain the 
land if the Aboriginal title comes to an end, either by surrender of the title 
to the Crown or if the titleholders cease to exist, in much the same way as a 
fee simple estate can be surrendered back to the Crown or will revert to the 
Crown by escheat if the fee simple owner dies intestate without heirs.
The unwritten part of the Canadian Constitution is based on the 
British Constitution, as provided by the Preamble to the Constitution Act, 
1867. In both the United Kingdom and Canada, the legislative branch can 
extinguish and infringe property rights, and give the executive branch 
authority to do so, as long as the intention to do so is clear and plain.92 
Given the division of powers in Canada’s federal system, Parliament alone 
had the power to extinguish or authorize the extinguishment of Aboriginal 
title up until section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 was enacted.93 Since 
then, even Parliament does not have this power, but Parliament can still 
infringe or authorize the infringement of Aboriginal title if the Sparrow test 
for justifiable infringement, as modified by Tsilhqot’in Nation, is met.94 Prior 
to Tsilhqot’in Nation, it was unclear whether provincial legislatures could 
infringe Aboriginal title,95 but in that decision the Supreme Court concluded 
that provinces can, provided they are able to justify the infringement.96 
However, given that this appears to have been a modification of existing law, 
the retroactive impact of this aspect of the decision is questionable.97
In sum, the title of the Crown that underlies Aboriginal title is a 
proprietary interest that has no present beneficial content. As a property 
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interest, it does not entail any authority to extinguish or infringe Aboriginal 
title. The power of the federal and provincial governments to infringe 
Aboriginal title is purely legislative, embedded in sections 91 and 92 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867.
